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COMPENSATING DIFFERENTIALS AND UNMEASURED
ABILITY IN THE LABOR MARKET FOR NURSES:
WHY DO HOSPITALS PAY MORE?
EDWARD J. SCHUMACHER

and BARRY T. HIRSCH*

Registered nurses (RNs) employed in hospitals realize a large wage
advantage relative to RNs employed elsewhere. Cross-sectional estimates indicate a hospital RN wage advantage of roughly 20%. This
paper examines possible sources of the hospital premium, a topic of
some interestgiven the current shiftingof medical care out of hospitals.
Longitudinal analysis of Current Population Survey data for 1979-94
suggests that a third to a half of the advantage is due to unmeasured
worker ability, and the authors conclude that the remainder of the
advantage probably reflects compensating differentials for hospital
disamenities. Supporting these conclusions is evidence that hospital
RNs have higher cognitive ability and higher-qualityjob experience
than non-hospital RNs, and indications that shift work accounts for
roughly 10% of the hospital premium.

Hospitals

playa crucialrolein thelabor

marketfornurses. More than 70% of
all registerednurses (RNs) and even more
youngRNs are employed in hospitals. This
paper examines the earningsof RNs, focusing specificallyon the sources of what is a
large wage differentialbetween hospital
and non-hospitalnurses. An understand-

*EdwardJ. Schumacher is AssistantProfessor of
Economics at East Carolina Universityin Greenville,
and BarryT. Hirsch is Professor of Economics and
Research Associate, Pepper Institute on Aging and
Public Policy,at Florida State Universityin Tallahassee. The authorsappreciate helpfulsuggestionsfrom
MarjorieBaldwin,Marie Cowart,GaryFournier,David
Macpherson, and Lester Zeager. The CPS data sets
used in thispaper were developed withthe assistance
of David Macpherson.

ing of the hospital premium is important,
especially given what is expected to be a
large shiftof medical care deliveryaway
fromhospitals and toward outpatient settings.
We firstpresentevidence on the hospital
premium using multiple years (1979-94)
of a large cross-sectionaldata set. We then
conduct a longitudinal analysis based on
multiplepanels of registerednurses,a procedure thatallows the hospital premiumto
be estimatednet of individual-specificskill

Copies of computer programs used to generate
resultspresented in the paper are available fromthe
authors. Schumacher: Department of Economics,
East Carolina University, Greenville, NC 27858.
Hirsch: Department of Economics, Florida State
University,Tallahassee, Florida 32306.

Industrialand LaborRelationsReview,Vol. 50, No. 4 (July1997). ( by Cornell University.
0019-7939/97/5004 $01.00

557

558

INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

or taste differences. What remains of the
premium provides an estimateof the compensating differentialdue tojob disamenities or other unmeasured factors. We further explore sources of the premium by
examiningdifferences
betweenhospitaland
non-hospitalRNs in pension and insurance
coverage, cognitiveability(as measured by
AFQT scores), qualityof workexperience,
returnsto union coverage, and work shift
differentials.We also look at hospital and
non-hospitalearnings in alternativeoccupations.

and retain higher-qualitynurses than do
employersin the non-hospitalsector, and
these skills are not reflectedfullyin measured variables. Hospitals provide medical

services requiring skill-intensive inputs of

nursing services,and some of these skills
are not required in non-hospital sectors.
Highlyskilledand motivatednursesmaybe
attracted to hospital employment,where
theirskillscan best be used. The outcome
of such labor marketsortingis an equilibrium in which hospital RNs realize higher
wages thanRNs outside of hospitals. At the
level of measurement, accurate data on
human capital and other productivity-reWage Differentials Between
lated worker attributeswould lower estiHospital and Non-Hospital Employees
mates of the hospital premium. Although
Previous studies of the nursing labor
differencesin RN qualityare generallyobmarket have noted large earnings differ- servable to employers,theyare largelyunences between similar hospital and nonmeasured in standard data sets. Hence, a
hospital RNs, but have not focused on exsignificantportion of the measured hospiplaining thispremium. For example, Link
tal wage premiumis likelyto be a compen(1988) found thattherewas a hospital presating skill differential.
mium of around 13% in 1984 (but did not
The other principal explanation forthe
finda premiumin an analysisof 1977 data).
hospital premium, emphasized by Lehrer
Booton and Lane (1985), using data froma
et al. (1991) and others,is that there exist
1981 surveyof Utah RNs, found that the
differencesinjob attributesbetweenhospihospital premiumwas largestforassociate
tal and non-hospital settings. If hospital
degree RNs (21%) and smallestfordiploma
jobs involve relativelyunpleasant characRNs (15 %). And Lehrer et al. (1991), using
teristics (irregular or late shifts,a high
a sample of Illinois RNs, noted a large
degree of stress,job hazards, and so on),
differencein earningsbetweenhospitaland
hospitals must pay a compensating differential to attractnurses of a given quality.
non-hospital RNs. Although the hospital
For example, nursesare likelyto preferthe
premiumwas not the focus of theirpaper,
regular hours, a relativelylow-riskwork
theysuggested thatit mightreflecta comenvironment,and close relationship with
pensating differential.
colleagues thatworkingin a practitioner's
Why might nursing wages differacross
sectors? If nurses have similar skills and
officemay offer.' If the tastesand preferpreferences, all nursingjobs are equally
attractive,and hospital and non-hospital
employers(thatis,physicians'offices,nurs'Job evaluation ratingsfromthe DictionaryofOccuing homes, and so on) compete in the same
pational Titles(DOT) give credence to both the skill
marketfor RNs (or, equivalently,there is
and workingconditions explanations forthe hospital
premium. Most DOT ratings are identical for the
labor mobility),in thelong runthereshould
occupational titles "general duty nurse" (RNs who
be no earnings differencesbetween the
provide general nursingcare to patients in hospitals
hospital and non-hospital sectors. Longand other health care facilities) and "nurse, office"
run equilibrium wage differentialsamong
(RNs who care for and treat patients in medical
RNs will arise, however,to the extent that offices as directed by physicians). Differences are
there are differencesin skillsand working thatgeneral (or hospital) RNs,as compared to RNs in
physicianoffices,are rated as requiringgreatermathconditions across sectors.
ematical development, more complexityin dealing
A plausible explanation forthe hospital
withpeople, greater strength,more frequent stooppremiumis thathospitalsdemand, attract, ing and bending of the body, greater abilityto per-
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ences ofRNs are sufficiently
heterogeneous,
compensatingwage differentialsshould be
small,but to the extentthatpreferencesfor
thesecharacteristicsare strongand similar,
wage differentialsmay be sizable.2
Although differencesin RN skills and
workingconditions between hospital and
non-hospital employmentare likelyto be
the principalexplanation forthe large hospitalwage advantage,otherpossibilitiescan
be considered. In a later section of this
paper, we examine the possibilitythat the
hospital differentialis accounted for by a
lowerleveloffringebenefits,bylabor union
bargaining power, and by differencesin
employersize.
An additional possibilityis that the differentialrepresentsa true rent. Hospitals
maychoose to pay an "efficiency"
wage that
exceeds the opportunitycost wage ifdoing
so results in increased worker effortand
reduced monitoringcosts(see, forexample,
Weiss 1990). The hospital premiumacts as
a "carrot"to induce a high level ofeffort,or
equivalently,the threat of losing the premium acts as a "stick"to preventshirking.
Consistent with the efficiencywage hypothesis is the finding by Groshen and
Krueger (1990) thathospitalswithgreater
supervision tend to pay lower wages than
hospitalswithless employee monitoring,as
measured bytheratioofsupervisorystaffto
total nursing personnel (Groshen and
Krueger did not compare hospitals with
non-hospitalsettings). On the other hand,

ceive attributesof objects throughfeeling,fulleradjustment of eyes to bring objects into focus, greater
abilityto distinguishcolors, and exposure to higher
noise levels (USDOL 1993:373).
2Estimatesof wage differentialsacross groups may
be biased because of differencesin workertastesand
abilities. This is a general problem, because standard
data sets do not have adequate measures of working
conditions and estimationof compensating differentials is not straightforward
even when such data exist
(Hwang et al. 1992). This studyhas the advantage
that it focuses primarilyon differentialswithin a
single occupation, so preferences and abilities are
more homogeneous than forbroader groups ofworkers. In addition, our longitudinal analysis accounts
for many differencesin worker-specificpreferences
and abilitynot measured directlyin the data.

an implicationof efficiencywage models is
that since workers receive rents, sectors
paying efficiencywages should have large
queues of qualified applicants (Weiss
1990:55)-whereas hospitals during the
1980s, on the contrary,were characterized
byreportsof severe RN shortages (Curran
et al. 1987). Efficiencywages, therefore,
are not likelyto provide the primaryexplanation for the hospital premium.
Some have argued thathospitalsface an
upward-slopingsupply curve for RNs and
thuspossess monopsonypower. This is not
a plausible explanation for the hospital
First,theexercise ofmonopsony
premiumn.
power would lead either to lowerwages in
hospitals than in competitivenon-hospital
marketsor to lowerwages in both sectorsif
hospitalsare price leaders. Second, recent
evidence (Hirsch and Schumacher 1995)
casts serious doubt on the hypothesisthat
monopsonyplaysa significantrole in nursing labor markets.
A final possibilityis that the hospital
premium is partly accountable to quasirents produced by the rapid growth in
health care costsover the past twodecades,
a growthparalleled by growthin nursing
wages. The existence of quasi-rentsis both
possible and likely,but it cannot explain
much of the hospital premium. Even if
health care expenditure growthwere concentratedin hospitals,quasi-rentsto hospital RNs would not survivein the long run,
since RNs are mobile across sectors and
rentswould be dissipated. It is implausible
that a sizable portion of the hospital premium,whichhas remained large overmany
years,could reflectshort-runquasi-rents.
Cross-Sectional Evidence on
the Hospital Wage Differential
The Cross-Sectional Data
In order to estimate the wage differential between hospital nurses and those employed in other sectors,we must account
fordifferencesacross individualsin human
capital and other earnings-relatedcharacteristics. The cross-sectionaldata for this
studyare drawnfromthe monthlyCurrent
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Table 1. Means of Selected Characteristics
for RNs, by Employment Status.
NursingPractitioner'sOther
Characteristic Hospital Home
Office Industry
Real Wage
16.73 13.72
Years of
14.98 14.44
Schooling
Age
37.26 44.29
Union Coverage 0.21
0.10
Percent PartTime
0.28
0.39
Public
Employment 0.21
0.15
Metro Area
(1,000,000+) 0.42
0.36
Sample Size
32,306 3,405

14.08

15.44

14.71
41.06
0.03

15.18
41.94
0.23

0.39

0.27

0.08

0.45

0.33
2,513

0.41
7,473

Source: CPS ORG files for the years 1979-94.
Notes: Real Wage is the mean wage measured in
December 1994 dollarsusingtheCPI-U. Practitioner's
Office includes nurses employed in the offices of
physicians,dentists,chiropractors,and optometrists
as well as in the officesof health practitionersnot
elsewhere classified. Union coverage is based on the
1983-94 ORG files.

Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) earnings filesforJanuary 1979 through December 1994. The
CPS, conducted monthlyby the Bureau of
the Census, is the primaryU.S. household
survey. Advantages of the CPS over other
data sets used to studyRN wages are that
data are available on an annual basis, RN
wages can be compared to non-nursing
wages,and large panels can be constructed
to make possible longitudinalwage change
analysis.
We include in our RN sample (n = 45,697)
all employed wage and salary registered
nurses ages 20 and over whose major activity was not schooling. Table 1 presents
mean characteristicsfor RNs for the years
1979-94 by employment status. RN employmentis partitioned into four sectors:
hospitals,nursinghomes, officesof health
practitioners (including physicians, denand health
tists,chiropractors,
optometrists,
practitionersnot elsewhereclassified),and
other industry.3The mean real wage rate
3The largest industr-y
classificationsin the "other
industry"group are health services not elsewhere

forhospital RNs is about $3 more than that
forRNs in practitioners'officesor nursing
homes (in December 1994 dollars).' Compared to RNs in othersectors,hospitalRNs,
on average,are younger,have higherunion
coverage, and are more likely to be employed in large metropolitanareas and in
public jobs (federal, state,or local).
The Cross-Sectional Model and Results
Next, a standard log wage equation of
the followingformis estimated:
(1)

InWi= fi,
j= I

+

y

y=22

X0+

E OhINDih

h= 2

YEARiy+ ei,

where lnW is the log of the real wage for
nurse i, XcontainsJ- 1 personal,job, and
labor marketcharacteristics(for example,
education, potentialexperience, union status,and region), and 3 contains the corresponding coefficients(XI = 1 and PI is the
intercept). IND contains H - 1 dummy
variables designatinghospital or other sectors of employment. The coefficientsin 0
are the adjusted log earningsdifferencesby
sector relative to the omitted group. YEAR
includes dummy variables for the years
1980-94. For now,eiis assumed to be a well-

classified (6.8% of the entire sample), elementary
and secondaryschools (2.3%), and personnel supply
services (this includes nursing temporaryagencies
and home health services,and accounts for2% of the
entire sample).
4Weeklyearnings are top-coded at $999 per week
in the surveysthrough 1988, and at $1,923 beginning
in January 1989. A maximum of 1.2% of RNs are at
the earnings cap in any year (1988); 0.4% are at the
cap in 1994. The control group (described below)
includes 3.9% at the cap in 1988 and 0.5% in 1994.
For workersat the cap, we assign the estimatedmean
earnings above the cap based on the assumption that
the upper tail is characterized by a Pareto distribution (see Hirsch and Macpherson 1996:6). We omit
individualswithan implied real hourlywage (that is,
usual weeklyearnings divided byusual hours worked
per week) less than $1.00 or greater than $99.99.
These groups likelyrepresentthosewithmismeasured
earnings or hours of work.
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1979-1994.
1. RN and ControlGroup Wage Growthand Hospital Wage Differential,
Figutre
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Notes: Data are fromtheCPS ORG filesfor1979-94. The seriesRN, LPN, and Controlplot regression
foreachgroup. See thetextfora
on yeardummies(1979= 0) fromlog wageequationsrunseparately
coefficients
of thecontrolgroupand fordiscussionof thevariablesincludedin thewage equations.The hospital
description
thatincludedseparateyeardummiesinteracted
serieswas calculatedfroman RN log-wageregression
differential
thusprovidingannualestimatesof thehospital
withhospitalemployment
(plus yeardummiesnotinteracted),
premiumfor1979-94.

behaved errorterm;we omit the time subscripttforconvenience.
Table 2 presentsregressionresultsfrom
equation 1.5 Turning firstto the employ5Variables in the regressionsother than controls
for sector of employment are years of schooling,
potential experience and itssquare, and dummies for
race (2), Hispanic status,gender, region (8), MSA/
CMSA size (7) for observations afterOctober 1985,
SMSA size (2) forobservationspriorto October 1985,
maritalstatus(2), part-timestatus(usual hoursworked
per week less than 35), public employment,and year
(15). The metropolitan area size dummies are included to capture differencesin cost of living and
DuMond, Hirsch, and
local area amenities.
Macpherson (1996) found that detailed region and
citysize dummies account fortwo-thirdsof the variation in cost of living across 182 metropolitan areas,
and thatinclusion of such controlsin a wage equation

ment sectordummies,afterwe account for
measured characteristics,we findlarge difis preferable to both estimation of a nominal wage
equation withoutcontrols and the fulladjustmentof
wages formeasured cost of livingdifferences.Results
here are highlysimilarwhen a single dummyforlarge
metropolitanarea (1 millionplus) is insteadincluded.
Many large hospitals are situated in the central cities
of urban areas, whereas other medical facilitiesare
located in the suburbs. Hence, part of the hospital
premium could reflectan urban wage gradient. In
subsequent longitudinal analysis, we measure the
followingcontrolforworkerhospitalwage differential
specific skills. The remaining differentialis attributed largelyto what we believe are unmeasured differences in working conditions, including, among
other things,the location of employment. The CPS
contains informationon central cityresidence, but
no informationon employmentlocation.
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Table 2. Determinants of Registered Nurses'
Earnings: Wage-Level Regression Results.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Coefficient
Estimates
Variable

(1)

(2)

Hospital

0.157
(0.003)

0.127
(0.004)
-0.078
(0.007)
-0.059
(0.007)
0.033
(0.001)
0.013
(0.000)
-0.023
(0.001)
-0.102
(0.006)
-0.041
(0.007)
-0.051
(0.011)
-0.028
(0.007)
0.002
(0.003)
0.017
(0.004)
0.014
(0.005)
0.010
(0.006)
45,697

Practitioner'sOffice
Nursing Home
Schooling
Potential Experience
Potential Experience
Squared/ 100
Black
Other Race
Hispanic
Female
Part-TimeStatus (hours
worked per week < 35)
Public Employment
Married, Spouse Present
Separated, Divorced, or
Widowed
Sample Size

0.034
(0.001)
0.014
(0.000)
-0.028
(0.001)
-0.101
(0.006)
-0.043
(0.007)
-0.049
(0.011)
-0.027
(0.007)
0.001
(0.003)
0.027
(0.004)
0.014
(0.005)
0.010
(0.006)
45,697

Source: CPS ORG files for the years 1979-94.
Notes:The dependent variable is the log of the real
wage. The omitted categoryin column 1 is all nonhospital employment;in column 2 "otherindustry"is
omitted. Beginning in October 1985, the CPS identified 202 MSA/CMSAs; before, only 44 SMSAs were
identified. For observationspriorto October 1985 we
include 3 size dummies, and for observations after
thattimewe include 7 size dummies. Other variables
included in the regression are dummies for region
(8) and year (shown in Figure 1). Potential Experience is measured as the lesser of age minus school
minus six or age minus 16.

ferencesin earningsforRNs across sectors.
Inclusion of a single dummyvariable for
hospital employment(column 1) indicates
thathospital RNs earn 17.0% higherwages
than non-hospitalRNs. Results in column

2, based on a regressionincluding separate
dummies for the four industrycategories,
reveal that hospital RNs earn 22.8% more
thanRNs employedin health practitioners'
officesand 20.4% more thanRNs employed
in nursing homes (other industryis the
omitted group).6 Figure 1 (right scale)
plots the hospital differentialestimated
separatelybyyear. This regressionis similar to that in column one, except that the
hospital RN dummyis interactedwithyear
dummies. Estimates vary modestly from
yearto year. We are not willingto inferthe
presence of trendsbased on thisevidence,
although the decline since 1992 is intriguing. Results presented throughoutthe remainder of the paper use the pooled 197994 sample. Inferences based on estimates
fromsubsets of the sample are identical.
Since RNs' job duties are likelyto varyin
and out of hospitals, a concern is that the
measured hospitalpremiumin partreflects
occupational returnswithinthe RN profession. The CPS does not allow us to distinguish staffRNs from,say, head nurses or
specialists. The Sample Survey of Registered Nurses, however,contains thisinformation.7 In a regressionpooling the 1984,
1988, and 1992 SSRN and including variables similarto those used in Table 2 (but
withoutoccupational controls),we findthat
hospital RNs earned about 17.6% higher
wagesthannon-hospitalRNs,a resulthighly
similar to our CPS estimate. When we
include four separate occupational controls (administrator;head nurse/supervisor;staff,
generalduty,or privatedutynurse;
and specialist,with "other"position as the

6The percentage differencein wages between hospital and practitioner'sofficeRNs is calculated from
the log differenceusing [exp(0.127 + 0.078) - 1] 100,
and a similar calculation is used for nursing home
RNs.
7The SSRN is a survey conducted by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Public
Health Services, Health Resource and Services Administration. The surveyis mailed to a sample of
currentlylicensed registerednurses and includes informationon theireducation and workhistory.The
SSRN provides roughly25,000 observations per survey.
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omitted group), the hospital differential
increases slightly,to 20.0%. The hospital
premium,therefore,does not appear to be
drivenbyoccupational differencesbetween
sectors.
Althoughthe major focus of the paper is
the effectof hospital employmenton earnings, other wage determinantspresented
in Table 2 are of interest. Wages of black
RNs are 9.6% lower than those of white
RNs. There is only a small differencein
earnings between those employed by the
public sector (federal, state, or local government) and those in the private sector.
Marital status has only a marginal impact
on wages, and, in sharp contrast with
economy-wideevidence, male and female
RNs earn similar wages. Also, RNs who
typicallywork less than 35 hours per week
earn wages similar to those of RNs who
work full-time,in contrastto the substantialpart-timepenaltyin the labor marketas
a whole (a similarresult is obtained using
the SSRN).
Not shownin Table 2 are coefficientson
the yeardummies,reflectingthe growthin
real wages during the 1979-94 period following control for measured characteristics. Figure 1 (leftscale) plots these coefficientsforRNs,as well as similarcoefficients
fromseparatewage regressionsforlicensed
practical nurses (LPNs) and a comparison
group of female workers,the latter to reflect economy-wide movements in wage
rates. The comparison group is collegeeducated women (those with at least 16
years' schooling) in non-health-related
occupations.8

The figureshows that with controls for
measured characteristics,real and relative
wages of RNs rose substantiallyover the
period. An RN in 1993 earned .251 log
points or 28.5% higher real wages than a
similar RN in 1979. This growthwas par-

8The controlgroup consistsof the followingbroad
occupational categories: executive, administrative,
and managerial; professional specialtyoccupations;
techniciansand related support;sales, administrative
support, and clerical; and service occupations (except protectiveand household services).

ticularlyrapid in the mid- to late 1980s, a
period when reported nursing shortages
were most severe. The RN wage index
peaks in 1993 and falls rather sharply,so
thatby 1994 the wage advantage relativeto
a similarRN in 1979 had fallen to .204 log
points.9LPN wages followeda patternsimilar to thatforRNs,withwage growthslower
in the late 1980s, but no decline in 1994
(annual sample sizes ofLPNs are small). In
contrast,the comparison group of collegeeducated women experienced far more
modest wage growthover the period, earning 7.6% higherreal wages in 1994 than in
1979. Note that the risingwages for RNs
relativeto this comparison group are particularlynoteworthysince there were widening skilland narrowinggenderwage gaps
over the period (Levyand Murnane 1992).
exceeded
Wage growthforRNs substantially
thatformale and femaleworkerseconomywide (these resultsnot shown).
Longitudinal Evidence on
the Hospital Wage Differential
Estimatesof the hospital premiumfrom
wage level equations may be biased owing
to omitted measures of worker ability. If
RN skills are not adequately measured by
years of schooling, potential experience,
variables,and
and theotherright-hand-side
if omitted measures of human capital are
correlated with hospital employment,the
hospital coefficientin a wage level equationwillbe a biased measure ofthe hospital
priemium.The hospital premiumobserved
in our cross-sectionalanalysis is likely to
reflectboth compensatingdifferentialsfor
working conditions and unmeasured differencesin abilitycorrelated withhospital
employment.10In this section we attempt

and Earnings,based on
9ResultsfromEmployment
CPS data, suggest that real earnings have continued
to fall. Median full-timeweeklyearnings among RNs
in 1996 were $697 (January1997, Table 39, p. 206), as
1995, 1994, and 1993 of$716,
compared to figures-for
$722, and $746, respectively,in constant1996 dollars.
10Foran analysisof the econometric issues associated with longitudinal estimation, see Jakubson
(1991).
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to determinethe extentof such bias and to
obtain longitudinal estimatesof the hospital premium that account forunmeasured
workerskills.
The Wage Change Model
Below, we modifyequation (1) to account forunmeasured worker-specific
skill
differencesfixed over a one-year period.
LettingX,representthe fixed effecton log
wages forworker 1 and adding a time subscriptt,thewage equation can be writtenas
(2)

J

H

Win = , jXijt+Y0(INDiht
In
y

+ Xi + e it.
+ 2;, yYEARiy
=1
y

The errortermin equation 1 is divided into
an individual-specificquality component

(Xi)fixedovertime(one year) and a ran-

dom, well-behaved,component (el'). If the
omitted fixed effect,X, is positivelycorrelated with hospital employment (that is,
more able workers are located in hospitals), then estimates of the hospital wage
premium from equation (2) are biased
upward.
Letting A represent changes between
adjacent years,a wage change equation will
taketheform(dropping theindividualsubscript i)
(3)

J

H

AlnWd=X jAXjd+YhAINDhd
A

+ X PdPERIODd + Ae d,
d=2

where d indexes the time periods over
which values are differenced,and PERIOD d
are dummies for the periods 1980/81
through1994/95 (with1979/80 as the reference period). The major distinctionbetween equations (3) and (2) is that the
effectsowing to unmeasured skillsfall out,
potentiallyallowingforunbiased estimates
of the quality-constanthospital premium.
Equation (3) provides an unbiased measure of the hospital wage differentialif
sectoral switchingis exogenous and ability

is equally valued at the margin by employers in both sectors (Gibbons and Katz
1992).1" The estimate of the hospital
premium is based on the change in wages
for RNs who switch either into or out of
hospital employment. If the hospital
premium is due entirely to hospitals attracting higher-skilled nurses, then the
estimate of 0 in the wage change equation should be close to zero, assuming
marginal products are equivalent across
sectors.
The specificationin equation (3) restricts
so that
the estimatesin 0 to be symmetrical,
the wage gains for hospital joiners are
equivalent to the wage losses for hospital
leavers, and the gains for hospital stayers
are the same as those for non-hospital
stayers.'2 To relax this assumption, we
subsequently include dummies for entry
into a hospital, exit out of a hospital, and
employmentin a hospital in the firstyear.
The coefficientson the joining and leaving variables measure the change in the

"If there is a comparative advantage among RN
switcherssuch that hospital RNs are absolutelymore
productive in hospitals and absolutely less able than
other RNs in, say,nursinghomes, then our interpretationdoes not follow. In thatcase the interpretation
of thewage change resultsdepends on the reason why
people are switching industries. More generally,
endogenous job and sectoral change may bias wage
change estimates. Biases exist in both directions.
For example, assume a hospital hires what turns
out to be a low-abilitynurse at the going hospital
wage. Once the mismatchis revealed, the nurse may
move to a lower-payingnon-hospitaljob. This would
bias upward longitudinal estimates of the hospital
premium, since we would observe a large wage decline. On the other hand, hospital nurses with an
unusually low current wage, or an unusually high
wage offerfrom a non-hospital employer, are most
likelyto voluntarilyswitchsectors,leading to a downward bias in hospital premiumestimates. Insufficient
informationis available to explicitlymodel selection
effectson job change.
'2Joinerand leaver coefficientsmay differif,for
example, slopes of wage profiles differ. A steeper
wage profile implies smaller gains for entrantsthan
losses for leavers. If hospitals tend to have flatter
profilesthan the non-hospitalsector,we mayexpect
a premium to hospitaljoiners larger than the loss to
hospital leavers.

NURSES
log wage, as compared to stayingin nonhospital or hospital employment,respectively. Although such a specification is
less restrictive, the gain from reduced
bias is offsetin part by the loss of precision attaching to separate estimatesbased
on the smaller samples of hospital joiners and leavers.
The Longitudinal Data
Panel data are constructed from two
sources (the appendix provides a detailed
description). First,we constructed multiple panels from the CPS ORG files for
1979/80 through1993/94 bymatchingindividualsin the same monthin consecutive
years. Second, we used the March CPS
surveysfor1980-95. These surveyscontain
retrospectiveinformationon each worker's
employmentin the previousyear,including
the number of employers,the occupation
and industryin which the employee was
employedforthelongestperiod, totalearnings fromall jobs, totalweeks worked,and
usual hours worked per week. The March
surveysalso contain informationon current
earnings (on the primaryjob) and employment fora quarter of the sample (the outgoing rotationgroups). Those who are not
outgoing in March provideinformationon
current earnings in either April, May, or
June. Matchingthe March surveyswiththe
ORG filesforthesemonthsprovidesa nearly
full sample of March CPS respondents for
1979/80 through 1994/95.
In order to maximize sample size, we
combined the ORG and March panel data
sets,aftereliminatingfromthe ORG panel
individuals surveyed in the months of
March, April,May,orJune (since theyare
already in the March panels). Because
measurementerroris a particularconcern
in longitudinal analysis,those with industry,occupation, or earningsallocated (that
is,assigned) bytheCensus are deleted from
the sample. The resultingpanel data set
for1979/80 through1994/95 containsdata
on 17,327 RNs, each observed in consecutiveyears. Of these, 11,887 (68.6%) were
employed in a hospital in both years,4,579
(26.4%) were employed outside of hospi-
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tals in both years, 338 (2.0%) switchedto
hospital employment,and 523 (3.0%) left
hospital employment.
It is importantto note thatthereexistsa
bias toward zero in panel estimates using
both the March and ORG data sets. Due to
the method of measuring the initial (year
1) wage in the March surveys,a downward
bias will be present to the extent that the
wage in year 1 reflectsthe wage in the new
employmentsettingand lowerstheobserved
effectofchangingindustry.This is because
the previousyear's wage is calculated from
earnings on all jobs. For example, an RN
who moves to a hospital from a health
practitioner'sofficelate in thefirstyearwill
reportthatthe industryin which he or she
was employed for the longest period last
yearwas a health practitioner'soffice.That
RN's earnings fromlast year,however,will
include the increase in wages due to hospital employment,and will bias downward
the estimatedeffectsofjoining a hospital.
The truewage effectsofjoining a hospital,
therefore,are somewhat larger than suggested by the coefficientestimates. Calculations in Macpherson and Hirsch
(1995:458n) suggesta bias of about 15%.
The ORG panels, although theydo not
sufferfrom the downward bias described
above, are more likelyto contain measurement error in the industry(that is, hospital) variable. These panels are constructed
from two separate surveyspotentiallyinvolving two separate interviewers and
interviewees,whereas the March data are
collected at a single point in time. Measurement error lowers the signal-to-noise
ratio and biases estimatesof the effectsof
changing employmentstatustowardzero.
The BLS has examined the issue of occupation and industrycoding in the CPS in
some detail (Polivka and Rothgeb 1993).
Measurementerroron industryassignment
is rather modest, while that on detailed
occupation is substantial. We are not concerned with measurement error on occupation, since we do not include occupational switchersin our analysis. Measurement errorappears less likelyto affecthospital (that is, industry)employmentthan
employmentin manyotherindustries,given
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7'able 3. Wage Level and Change
Regression Results for Registered Nurses.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
DependentVariable
Independent
Variable
HOSP

InW

AInW

AInW AInW

0.079
(0.012)

0.071
(0.012)
0.087
(0.046)
0.008
(0.014)

0.163
(0.005)

AHOSP

AHosP*Mover
Mover
AHOSP*PractitionerAHosP*NurHome
AHosP*Other
Adj. R2
n

0.215
17,327

0.014
17,327

0.175
(0.029)
0.100
(0.024)
0.050
(0.015)
0.014
0.015
17,327 17,327

Source:Combined ORG/March panels from1979/
80 through 1994/95.
Notes: The regression in Column (1) is a levels
regressionwiththe log of the real wage in year2 as the
dependent variable. HOSP is a dummyvariable equal
to one if the individual is employed in a hospital in
year 2. The regressionsin columns (2), (3), and (4)
are wage change regressionswith the change in the
log of the real wage as the dependent variable. AHOSP
is the change in hospital employmentstatusbetween
years,and equals 1 (-1) ifthe individualjoined (left)
hospital employmentbetween years and zero otherwise. A Moveris defined as an individualwho changed
counties betweenyears. The March 1985 surveyquestion on movingdiffersfromthe corresponding question in other years. A dummyvariable was included
for these individuals so that estimates presented in
the table would not be affected. In addition to the
variables indicated, these regressions include the
change in public sector status, the change in parttime status,the change in experience squared, year
dummies, and a dummy designating those in the
March panel. These regressionsdo not include the
change in schooling, race, region,metropolitanarea,
or sex.

thatrespondentsprovide the name of their
employer and coders assign the industry
code.
In order to gain additional insightinto
this issue, however, we turn to the 1992
SSRN, which for the firsttime asked RNs

their employmentsetting (hospital, nursing home, and so on) the previousyear and
if they were employed by the same employerin the same position last year. This
provides us withan independent measure
of the extent of moving among RNs, one
likelyto have littlemeasurementerror. In
the merged March/ORG panel, 2.0% of
the sample were hospitaljoiners and 3.0%
were hospital leavers. Analogous numbers
fromthe SSRN (we define a switcheras an
RN who says she changed employers and
who has changed from hospital to nonhospital employment,or vice-versa) indicate that 1.9% were hospital joiners and
3.2% were hospital leavers. Such a close
correspondence, which suggeststhatmeasurement error associated withour hospital switchingvariable is small, increases
confidencein thepaper's principalresults.3
Wage Change Results
Table 3 presents the resultsof the wage
change regressionmodels.4 For comparison, the firstcolumn presentsthe hospital
coefficientfrom a standard log wage regressionrun in levelsusing theyear2 informationfromthe panel data set (non-hospital employmentis the omitted category).
The second column displays results from
estimatingequation (3) witha single variable for the change in hospital employment. The coefficientfalls from0.163 in

13Becausethe SSRN does not contain information
about earnings or hours worked the previous year,
wage change analysisis not possible.
"I4ndividuals withtop-coded (thatis,capped) earnings in eitheryearare omittedfromthe wage change
models, as are those withvalues of occupation, industry,or weeklyearnings thathave been allocated (that
is, assigned) by the Census. Hourly.earnings calculated fromMarch retrospectivesurveysfor the previous yeartend to be higherthan currentearningsfrom.
the CPS ORG forthe second year,in partbecause the
formerincludes earnings fromalljobs. We include a
dummyvariable in the wage change equations designating whether the observation is from the March
sample. This dummyyields a significantcoefficient
of about -.07. When we estimatewage change models
separately for each data set, we arrive at the same
conclusions presented in the paper.
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the levels equation to 0.079 in the change
equation, suggesting that approximately
half of the hospital premium is due to
higher unmeasured skills among hospital
RNs. The hospitalpremium,followingcontrol forworker-specificskills,is about 8%.
These resultsprovide support for our hypothesis that a substantial portion of the
observed hospital wage advantage reflects
higher skillsamong hospital RNs.
The March CPS data contain information on geographic mobilityand allow the
effectsofchanginghospitalemploymentto
be estimated net of any mobilityeffects.
Individuals in the ORG panels are by definition non-movers,since if they changed
households theyare no longer included in
the CPS and cannot be in the panel. A
moveris defined here as an individualwho
changed counties between years. The results in column 3 capture the interaction
between the change in hospital employmentand thedecision to move. The dummy
variable AHosP*Moveris set to 1 (-1) when
the individualbothjoins (leaves) a hospital
and moves and 0 otherwise.
The results indicate particularlylarge
wage changes for those who move and
change hospital status-.158 log points
(.071+.087) versus .071 for non-movers
changing hospital status. RNs movingbut
not changing hospital statusexhibit virtuallyno real wage gain (.008), as compared
to thosewho do not move. We are reluctant
to attach much weight to the large wage
changes among RNs who both move geographicallyand change sector of employment,giventhe small numberin thisgroup
(61) and the absence of wage changes for
RNs who are geographic moversbut do not

"5One could, argue that geographic movers may
readily obtain informationabout what are relatively
homogeneousjob opportunitiesamong a city'shospitals, and at the same time have poor information
regarding the rather diverse job opportunities in
practitioneroffices,outpatient health facilities,and
other siteswhere personal contacts and area-specific
knowledge is essential. But if informationaldifferences are drivingthe results,we should also observe
geographic movinggains forthe large sample of RN
hospital stayers,and markedlylower gains (or losses)
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change hospital status.'5
The specificationin column 4 provides
estimatesof the hospital premiumthatcan
differdepending on the sectorfromwhich
RNs enter or exit. Three separate dummy
variables are included forchanging hospital employment status (dummies are included but not shownforthree of the four
typesof stayers). The resultsshow thatthe
hospitalpremium,which
"quality-adjusted"
averaged .079 (column 2), differssubstantially across alternative types of employment. The wage gain for those moving
fromemploymentin health practitioners'
offices to hospitals is quite large (.175),
whereas wage changes among RNs moving
to or fromemploymentin nursinghomes
or other industriesare much smaller (.100
and .050).
These resultscontrastwiththe cross-sectional differentials(Table 2) showingsimilar RN wages in health practitioners' offices and nursing homes. A reasonable
explanation fortheseresultsis thatwhereas
the large quality-adjustedwage differential
between hospital and health practitioner
RNs stems in no small part from more
onerous working conditions in hospitals,
the smallerwage changes observed among
RNs switchingbetween hospitals and nursing homes or other employment sectors
suggeststhatthe hospital premiumrelative
to these sectors derives primarily from
nurse-specificability differences. Direct
evidence on industry-wide
injuryrates, although it does not provide a comprehensive measure of RN working conditions,
indicates a very safe environmentwithin
practitioner offices,a relativelyhigh-risk
hospital environment,and dangerous employmentwithinnursinghome. In contrast
to a 1992 economy-wideprivatesectorrate
of 3.6 injuries involvinglost worktime per
hundredworkers,employeesin healthpractitioneroffices(RNs and non-RNs) had an
injury rate of only 0.8. The injury rate

among the many non-hospital stayerswho move. In
fact, the data indicate littlewage change among either group of geographic movers (these results not
shown).
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Table 4. Asymmetric Wage Level and
Change Estimates of the Hospital
Differential forJoiners and Leavers.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
DependentVariable
Category
HOSP
HOSPJOIN
HOSPLEAVE
HOSPJOIN*Mover

HOSPLEAVE*Mover

Mover

AInW

AInW

-0.024
(0.006)
0.081
(0.019)
-0.061
(0.015)

-0.027
(0.006)
0.071
(0.020)
-0.053
(0.016)
0.069
(0.086)
-0.103
(0.056)
0.006
(0.015)

InW,

InW2

0.195
.0.168
(0.006) (0.005)
0.033
0.109
(0.019) (0.017)
-0.071 -0.134
(0.015) (0.013)

Notes: See notes to Table 3. Separate estimatesof
the hospital wage differentialare provided based on
the samples of RNs who are hospital joiners and
leavers. HOSP = 1 if employmentwas in a hospital in
year 1. The regression in column (3) is a levels
regressionwiththe log of the real wage in year 1 as the
dependent variable and hospital status dummies included-HOSP, HOSPJOIN, and HOSPLEAVE, withNONHOSP
as the omitted group. Column (4) shows similar
results using the wage in year 2 as the dependent
variable.

withinhospitalswas 4.1 and the rate within
nursingand personal care facilitieswas 9. 1,
the latterbeing among the highest in the
economy (U.S. Department of Labor
1995:18-29, Table 1)2 16
Table 4 shows the results of alternative
wage change and wage level models that
relax the assumptionof symmetry
between
leavers andjoiners. The resultsin column
1 show that hospitaljoiners receive a pre-

16Differencesin rates for hospitals and nursing
homes overstateriskdifferencesforRNs, since many
of the injuries withinnursing homes are sufferedby
nursing aides. In a ranking of industries based on
back injuries involvinglost work time, nursing and

personalcare facilitieshad the highestrate of any
industry-3.29 per 100 workersannually,versus 0.85
economy-wide(U.S. Department of Labor 1995:15).

mium of 8.4% relative to non-hospital
stayers.Hospital leaversreceiveabout 5.9%
lowerwages than hospital stayers. (HosP=1
if in a hospital in year 1, so leavers have a
wage change .061 log points less than hospital stayersand .085 log points less than
non-hospital stayers.) Column 2 allows
separateeffectsforgeographicmovers.RNs
whojoin a hospital but do not move receive
a wage gain of 7.4%, while those who both
move and join a hospital receive a gain of
15.0% (the joint effect of HOSPJOIN and
HOSPJOIN*Mover). Those who leave hospi-

tals but do not move receive 5.2% lower
wages, while those who also move receive
an additional penaltyof 9.8%.
The resultssuggestrathermodest asymmetrybetween the premium for joiners
and the penalty for leavers. A test of the
null hypothesisthatthe coefficientforjoiners is the same (in absolute value) as that
forleaversfailsto rejectthe null (F = 0.648).
Because the RN labor marketwas relatively
tightover our sample period, most RNs in
our sample who changed employmentdid
so voluntarily. This suggests that RNs
change hospital employment to receive
higher utility(wages, fringes,and job attributes). A hospital joiner, therefore,
would receive a wage gain for changing
jobs in addition to a premiumforless pleasant working conditions. A leaver would
receive a net utilitygain for changing as
well, but would see lowerwages due to the
improved workingconditions of non-hospital employment. Thus, we would expect
the loss to voluntaryleaversto be lower (in
absolute value) than the gain to joiners.
Our results indicate that this is the case,
although the differenceis not statistically
significant.

The evidence on geographic movers in
column 2 provides additional evidence on
this point. Joiners and leavers who also
move are more likely to be exogenous
switchers,since thedecision byRNs to move
geographicallymaybe tied more closelyto
the move decision of theirspouses than to
theirownjob opportunities. In contrastto
our findingof somewhat largerJOIN gains
than LEAVE losses among switcherswho do
not move (.071 versus -.053), wage losses
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forleavers (-.156) are at least as large as the
gain for joiners (.140) among hospital
switcherswho move.17
The effectsof unmeasured ability on
hospital premium estimates also can be
demonstratedusing wage level estimation
incorporatinginformationfromthe subsequent or previousperiod. 8 Columns 3 and
4 of Table 4 show wage regressionsrun in
levels including dummies for the four employmenttransitiongroups to identifyyear
one and year two wages. Included are
dummies for firstyear hospital employment (HOSP), hospital employees in year 2
only (HOSPJOIN), and hospital employees in
year1 only(HOSPLEAVE), withnon-hospital
stayersthe omitted comparison group.
Column 3 uses the log real wage from
year 1 as the dependent variable. The
coefficienton hosP (.195) indicatesa 21.5%
premiumforRNs employed in hospitals in
year 1, as compared to RNs who will be
employed outside of hospitalsin bothyears.
The coefficienton HOSPJOIN indicates that
those who subsequentlywilljoin a hospital
in year 2 already earn a 3.4% premium in
non-hospitalemploymentin year 1. That
is, RNs are rewardedforhigherabilityeven
beforetheyjointhe hospital,and theyelect
to switch to hospital employment even
though theyare paid more in non-hospital
employmentthan other RNs withidentical
measured characteristics. The coefficient
on HOSPLEAVEindicates thatin year 1, wages
forhospitalRNswhowillsubsequentlyleave
are already6.9% lower than those fortheir
hospital co-workers,even before theyexit
the hospital. This is consistentboth with
the abilitysortinghypothesisin which less
able RNs exit hospital employment,and a
mobilitymodel wherein hospital RNs re-

17Analternativeapproach would be to estimatean
endogenous switchingmodel. Because of a lack of
adequate instrumentscorrelated with hospital employmentbut not earnings, however,we do not pursue this approach.
'8Although the estimation of this equation is, in
principle,equivalent to thatof the wage change equations,in practice the estimatesdiffer,largelybecause
of a differingstructure of errors in levels and in
changes (Mincer 1983).

ceivingrelativelylow wages are most likely
to leave.
Using similarlogic, the specificationin
column 4 uses theyear2 wage as the dependent variable. Those who have joined a
hospital realize an 11.5% wage advantage
compared to RNs in non-hospitalemployment, but 5.7% (calculated from the log
differential.109-.168 = -.059) less than
RNs who were employedin hospitalsin year
1. Those who have left hospital employment in year 2 receive 12.5% less than RNs
remaining in hospital employment.
Additional Evidence on the Source
of the Hospital Wage Differential
Hospital Premiums Among
Alternative Occupations
We have presentedevidence showingthat
RNs exhibit a sizable hospital wage premium,withroughlya thirdto a halfreflecting higher (unmeasured) skills. The remainder resultsfromwhat we believe are
forworkingconcompensatingdifferentials
ditions. In thissectionwe presentan analysisforhospital and non-hospitalworkersin
otheroccupations in order to gain insight
into the nature of the RN premium. A
findingthat most hospital workersreceive
premiumssimilarin magnitude to thatreceived by hospital RNs would support the
thesisthatsubstantialrentsare being shared
by all hospital workersor that there exist
workdisamenitiesin hospitalsforall workers and not just RNs. If these premiums
decline substantiallywhen wage change
analysisis employed,an implicationis that
hospitals are matched with high-quality
workersin all occupations.
Table 5 presents unadjusted log wage
differentials
betweenhospitaland non-hospital workers,as well as estimatedhospital
premiumsbased on wage level and change
equations. The occupations analyzed are
health technologists and technicians (licensed practicalnursesand radiologic and
other technicians); health service occupations (including health aides and nursing
aides); administratorsand managers; secretaries, stenographers, and typists;and
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Table 5. The Hospital Premium forAlternativeOccupations.

(Standard Errorsin Parentheses)

Description
Unadjusted Log Wage Differential
Regression Coefficients:
Hospital (fromwage level eqn.)
AHospital (fromwage change
eqn.)
Sample Size
Number of Switchers
%Hosp (in at least 1 year)

Health
Health
Service
Administrators
Cleaning
Technologies Occupations and Managers
Secretaries Occupations
0.065

0.178

0.140

-0.006

0.042

0.063
(0.006)
0.037
(0.015)
12,484
578
57.1

0.152
(0.006)
0.103
(0.015)
16,382
646
31.2

0.050
(0.010)
0.052
(0.026)
65,591
252
3.0

-0.011
(0.007)
0.016
(0.016)
44,349
459
6.7

-0.003
(0.009)
0.121
(0.027)
18,961
223
10.7

Source: Combined ORG/March panels from 1979/80 through 1994/95.
Notes: The unadjusted wage differentialis the differencebetween the average log hospital wage and the
average log non-hospitalwage foreach occupation. The coefficienton Hospital is the coefficienton a hospital
dummyin a log wage regression. This regressionalso includes as right-hand-sidevariables potential experience
and itssquare, yearsofschooling,and dummies forrace (2), Hispanic, sex, metropolitanarea, maritalstatus(2),
part-timestatus,region (8), and year (15). The coefficienton AHospital is the coefficienton a wage change
equation thatalso includes the changes in part-timestatus,public employment,experience squared, and year
dummies.

cleaning and building serviceoccupations.
Hospital differentials
are evidentamong
all occupations apart fromsecretaries,but
are substantially
smallerthanthoseforRNs.
Unlike the results for RNs, there is little
evidence ofa large compensatingpremium
for higher skills among non-RN hospital
workers,as seen by the rather small absolute changes in the premiumsmovingfrom
wage level towage change estimates.While
selective matching on quality and a large
hospital skillpremiumappear to be unique
to RNs, non-skill-related(that is, longitudinal) hospital premiums of roughly 510%-similar in size to the premium observedforRNs-are realized byadministrators and managers, cleaning occupation
workers,and workersin health service occupations. In contrast,health technologistsand secretariesdisplay small longitudinal premiums on the order of 2-4%.
Were the non-skill-relatedpremiums due
to rent-sharing,
we would expect the rents
to be shared by most hospital workers,regardlessofoccupation,withlengthyqueues
ofqualified applicants. This is not the case.
The comparison of hospital premiums
among RNs with those for other occupa-

tional groups does not allow us to conclude
decisivelywhetherit is workingconditions
that account for the longitudinal premiums, absent more direct evidence on job
disamenities and how theydifferby occupation. What we can conclude from this
analysis is that (1) the magnitude of the
hospital wage premium is substantially
largerforRNs than forother occupational
groups; (2) although a substantialshare of
the RN hospital premiumis accounted for
by high unmeasured skill among hospital
nurses, positive sortingon skill is not importantforotherhospitaloccupations; and
(3) a hospital wage advantage is evident
among some but not all hospital workers,
and where it is in evidence, probably it
largelyreflectsunmeasured differencesin
workingconditions between hospital and
non-hospitalemployment.
Hospital Versus NonHospital Fringe Benefits
The analysisto thispoint has considered
only monetarycompensation. One possibilityis that hospitals pay higher wages to
compensate for lower non-wagebenefits.
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Table 6. Additional Evidence on the Hospital Premium for Registered Nurses.
Measure
1. Pensions
Plan Offered
Coverage
2. Health Insurance
Coverage
All Paid
Some Paid
None Paid
FamilyCovered
3. AFQT (percentile score)
4. Measures of Market Experience
a) Work Exp./Potential Exp. (SIPP)
b) Company Tenure/Potential Exp. (SIPP)
c) Company Tenure/Potential Exp. (CPS)
d) Occupational Tenure/Potential Exp. (CPS)
5. Union Coverage Coeff. (s.e.)
6. Proportion DualJob
Single Job Holders, PrimaryWage
Dual Job Holders, PrimaryWage
RNs withSecond Job in Hospital
ln W- lnW
RNs withSecond Job in Nonhospital
lnWs lnWP

Hospital

Non-Hospital

0.824
0.643

0.648
0.522

0.743
0.383
0.585
0.032
0.497
67.8

0.598
0.458
0.505
0.037
0.466
53.2

0.016
(0.005)
0.098
17.77
18.55

0.859
0.278
0.294
0.635
0.076
(0.009)
0.129
15.88
17.00

-0.012

0.078

-0.104

0.012

0.927
0.448
0.475
0.709

N
12,002

12,002

89
378
378
2,663
2,763
34,797
71,127
63,439
7,688
3,083
4,605

Sourcesand definitions:Data for rows 1 and 2 are from the March CPS surveysfrom 1980 through 1995.
Definitions of items in the firstcolumn: Coverage-percentage of employees covered by employer-sponsored
health insurance or pension plans; AllPaid-portion of health insurance plans paid in fullbythe employer;Some
Paid-proportion paid in part by the employer; None Paid-proportion paid in full by the employee; Family
Covered-proportion of those with insurance that covers some or all of their-familymembers; AFQT-mean
AFQT percentile score, taken fromthe 1991 cross-sectionof the NLSY; WorkExp./Potential
Exp.-ratio of actual
work experience to potential experience, taken fromthe 1990 Surveyof Income and Program Participation;
-ratio of company tenure to potential experience, taken fromthe SIPP; Company
CompanyTenure/PotentialExp.
Tenure/Potential
Exp. and OccupationalTenure/Potential
Exp. (rows 4c and 4d) -ratio of company tenure and
occupational tenure to potential experience, taken fromthe CPS tenure supplements forJanuary1983, 1987,
and 1991; Union CoverageCoeff.
-regression coefficientson union coverage froma pooled log wage equation
including separate hospital and non-hospital interaction terms,using data fromthe 1983-94 CPS ORG files;
Proportion
DualJob-proportion who hold more than one position in nursing for pay, taken fromthe Sample
Surveyof Registered Nurses for 1984, 1988, and 1992; PrimaryWage-average real wage in the primaryjob (in
December 1994 dollars); ln W-mean log wage in the primaryjob; ln Wi-mean log wage in the secondaryjob.

The March CPS supplements contain
information on the availability of health
insurance and pension plans. Row 1 of
Table 6 shows that hospital employees
have a higher probability of being offered a pension plan by their employer
and of participating in this plan than do
non-hospital employees. While 52.2% of
non-hospital RNs have pension coverage
(other than Social Security), 64.3% of
hospital RNs are covered. The result for

health insurance is similar: about threequarters of hospital RNs are covered by
an employer-sponsored health insurance
program, compared to only 60% of nonhospital RNs. Of those with insurance
plans, similarproportions of hospital and
non-hospital employers pay for at least
part of the plan. These results show that,
if anything,the hospital RN wage advantage understates the advantage in total
compensation.
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Evidence on Nursing Skills: AFQT,
Work Experience, Tenure, and
Occupational Experience
The CPS data set used in our analysis
contains fewdirect measures of skill. Our
panel analysis indicates that a substantial
portion of the hospital wage premium is
accounted for by unmeasured worker-specific skills. In this section, we use alternative data sets with evidence on cognitive
ability,occupational experience, company
tenure,and workexperience among hospital and non-hospitalRNs. If hospital RNs
have higherproductivitythan RNs in other
sectors,thenwe should observecorresponding differencesin these measurable correlates of workerskill.
We firstturnto the National Longitudinal Surveyof Youth (NLSY), which administered the Armed Forces QualifyingTest
(AFQT) in 1981, withindividuals ranging
in age from16 to 24 at the time theywere
tested (scores were renormed in 1989).
The AFQT, a widelyused measure of individual premarket cognitive ability,is expressed as a percentile score and is based
on the average of fourtestsincluded in the
broader Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery.We use the 1991 cross-section
of the NLSY, which contains data on 89
RNs, 72 employed in hospitals and 17 outside of hospitals.
As seen in line 3 of Table 6, the mean
AFQT percentile score forRNs is 65.1, substantiallyhigher than the 50 percentile
population average and the mean scores of
49.4 and 30.4 for LPNs and nursingaides,
respectively(because theNLSYoversamples
minorities,all figuresare sample-weighted
means). Consistentwithexpectations, we
find that hospital RNs have a mean AFQT
percentile score of 67.8, as compared to a
mean of 53.2 for non-hospital RNs. Because aptitude testscores increase withage,
we also ran a (sample-weighted)regression
with AFQT on the left-handside, and a
hospital dummy and dummies for age
when the exam was administered on the
right-hand side. The coefficient (standard error) on the hospital dummy was
13.49 (5.74), verysimilar to the 14.6 per-

centile difference without age adjustment.

Although the observed difference in
premarketaptitude between hospital and
non-hospitalRNs adds support to our abilityhypothesis,abilitydifferencesmeasured
by the AFQT account forat most a modest
portion of the labor marketskilladvantage
among hospital RNs. In a wage regression
similar to that estimated in Table 2, we
obtain an estimateof the hospitalpremium
of .32 log points. Following control for
AFQT, the estimated hospital advantage
declines to .27. Although AFQT scores
capture some of the skillsvalued in nursing
markets,most of the worker-specificskills
reflected in our longitudinal analysis involve abilities not measured bygeneral aptitude tests.'9
In lines 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d of Table 6,
evidence is provided on work experience,
companytenure,and occupational tenure.
We measure each of these proxies formarket skillrelativeto yearsof potential experience (that is, years since completing
schooling), thevariableused in our empirical work. In each of these cases, hospital
RNs display an advantage relative to nonhospital RNs. Work experience data on
378 RNs included in the 1990 Survey of
Income and ProgramParticipation (SIPP)
indicate that hospital RNs have worked
92.7% of their potential years of experience, as compared to 85.9% among nonhospital RNs.2") The SIPP also contains
informationon tenure on the currentjob,
and line 4b indicates thathospitalRNs have
spent 45% of their potential experience

'9Cawleyet a]. (1996) provided evidence fromthe
NLSY that measured cognitive ability,while correlated with wages, explains little of the variance in
wages across individualsor over time,as compared to
schooling and familybackground measures. Neal
and Johnson (1996), however, showed that differences in AFQT scores, absent control for schooling
and otherwage correlates,account fora sizable share
of mean black-whitewage differences.
2"The work experience variable in the SIPP was
calculated as the number of years the individual
worked at least 6 monthsin thatyear. The SIPP data
were kindlyprovided to us by Marjorie Baldwin.
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withtheircurrentemployer,compared to
28% fornon-hospitalRNs. Turningnextto
CPS tenure supplementsforJanuary1983,
1987, and 1991, hospital RNs are found to
have spent 48% of their potential experience withtheircurrentemployer,as compared to 29% among non-hospital RNs.
Finally,occupational tenure(obtained from
the same CPS surveys)relativeto potential
experience is high forRNs, accounting for
71 % of potentialyearsamong hospital RNs
and 64% among non-hospitalRNs.
The evidence provided in this section
provides some insightinto the sources of
skillsreflected
unmeasuredworker-specific
in our previous longitudinal estimates.
Differencesbetween hospital and non-hospital RNs in AFQT scores,workexperience,
and firm and occupational tenure reinforceour conclusion thatunmeasured skills
account for a significantportion of the
hospital wage advantage.
Union and Employer Size
Effects on the Hospital Premium
The panel resultsin Tables 3 and 4 were
estimated without controlling for union
status,since the March surveysdo not ask
retrospectivequestions on union coverage
(the monthly ORG earnings files began
includingunion statusquestions injanuary
1983). Because most unionized RNs are
employedin hospitalsor "otherindustries"
(see Table 1), itis possible thatthe hospital
premiumis drivenby differencesin union
status. The union premium for RNs is far
too small,however,to account formuch of
the hospital premium (forevidence on the
RN union premium, see Adamache and
Sloan 1982; Cain et al. 1981; Feldman and
Scheffler1982; or Hirsch and Schumacher,
forthcoming).Whenwe include thechange
in union statusin a wage-change equation
(using onlythe ORG panels from1983/841993/94), the coefficienton the change in
from
hospitalemploymentfalls
onlyslightly,
0.059 to 0.057, indicating that littleof the
hospital premium is explained by union
status. Consistentwithprior evidence, we
find that union premiums are smaller in
hospitalsthanin non-hospitalsettings.Row
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5 of Table 6 reveals a union-nonunion differentialfor RNs within hospitals of only
1.6%, as compared to a differential of
7.9% in non-hospital settings. Although
the magnitudes of the union premiums
are small, this pattern is consistent with
the economy-wide finding of smaller
union premiums among large employers
than among small employers (Mellow
1983).
Previous research has demonstrated a
large economy-wideemployer size effect
(Brown and Medoff1989). Since hospitals
tend to be large,partof the premiumcould
be due to a phenomenon similar to one
thatoccurs in otherlarge firmsor establishments. In work not shown, we examined
the effectsof employersize in the nursing
labor marketusing the CPS benefitsupplementsfor May 1979, 1983, and 1988. Our
resultsshowthatthereare large size effects
and that the hospital premium falls substantiallywhenwe controlforeitherfirmor
establishmentsize. There remainsa significant premium, however, of between 5%
and 6%. Our result with respect to size
does not explain the hospital premium,but
suggeststhat the explanation may involve
many of the same factors driving the
economy-wideemployer size effect. And
evidence suggests that some of the size
premium reflects higher-skilledworkers
among large employers (for example,
Brown and Medoff1989; Reilly 1995).
The Effects of Secondary Jobs
ManyRNs workin second jobs as nurses,
some withinhospitalsand othersoutside of
hospitals. The use of dual job information
providesan alternativemethodformeasuring the hospital wage differential,controlling forunmeasured person-specificskills.
Whereas longitudinal analysis measures
wage changes for given nurses changing
sectors over time, the dual job analysis
measureswage differencesforgivennurses
takingjobs in differentsectors during a
single time period. Both methods control
forworkerfixedeffects.The dual job comparison, however, is complicated by the
fact that multiplejob holders presumably
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face a maximum hours constraint on at
least one of theirjobs.
The Sample Surveyof RegisteredNurses
(SSRN) askslicensed RNs iftheyhold more
than one nursingjob for pay. If theyrespond yes,the surveythen asks about their
sector of employment, as well as hours
workedper week,number ofweeksworked
per year, and annual earnings on the second job. Row 6 of Table 6 provides information from the SSRN. Approximately
10% of hospitalRNs and 13% of non-hospital RNs workat second nursingjobs,40% of
these second jobs (for both groups) being
in hospitals. Evident from row 6 is that
wages in the primaryjob among dual job
holders exceed thewages ofsinglejob holders,suggestingthatdual job RNs tend to be
highlymotivatedor skilled.
Row 6 provides log wage differencesbetween the secondary and primaryjobs for
the four possible groups of dual job holders. LettingP representthe primaryjob,S
the secondaryjob, Ha hospitaljob, and N
a non-hospitaljob,we observe the log wage
differencelnWs- ln Wpforthose whose (P,
S) job pairs are HH, NN, NH, and HN.
Sectoral stayersshow littlelog wage difference between their secondary and primaryjobs,-.01 forhospital stayersand .01
fornon-hospitalstayers. (Owing to a high
variance in second job wages, mean dollar
wages are higher in secondary than in primaryjobsforbothgroups.) Amongsectoral
movers, we observe a .08 wage gain for
hospital 'joiners" (NH) and a -.10 wage
change forhospital "leavers"(HN). We can
on wage differencesfor
impose symmetry
sectoral stayersand changers byregressing
ln Ws- ln Wpon AHOSP. This yields a coefficient on AHOSP of .092 (with a standard
errorof .012). This quality-adjustedhospital wage advantage estimate of .09, based
on dual job sectoral changers, is highly
similar to our earlier estimate of a .08
hospital advantage based on sectoral
changers over time (Table 3). These
results reinforce our earlier conclusion
that a significant portion of the crosssectional hospital premium reflects
higher unmeasured skills among hospital nurses.

Shift Differentials
The resultsthusfarsuggestthatroughly
a thirdto a halfof the cross-sectionalhospital premium is due to omitted skill,while
the remainder is a premium directlyrelated to hospital employment,presumably
due to compensating differencesfor job
attributes.Informationonjob characteristics (shiftworked, level of risk at the job,
and so on) would allow thislatterpresumption to be tested more directly.
The 1985 and 1991 dualjob supplements
to the May CPS surveycontain work shift
information. To get a full sample (since
onlya quarter of the Maysurvey,the outgoing rotation groups, contain information
on earnings),we merged these Maysupplementswiththefull-yearORG data (workers
not outgoing in May are outgoing inJune,
July,or August,withearnings information
in one of these months). These data allow
us to estimate the shiftpremium and see
how accounting forshiftaffectsthe hospital wage differential.
The top panel of Table 7 shows mean
wages and employment status by shift.
About halfof the sample worksthe daytime
shift,and real wages are lowest for these
RNs. Eveningshiftnursesearn, on average,
5.0% higher wages than day shiftnurses,
and night shiftnurses earn 12.7% higher
wages thandayshiftnurses. A large proportion of evening and night shiftRNs are
employed in hospitals, while few RNs in
health practitioners'officesworkevenings
or nights. Those workingsplit or rotating
shiftsearn higherwages and are more likely
to be employed in hospitals than are day
shiftnurses.
The second panel ofTable 7 displaysthe
effectsof controllingfor shifton hospital
premiumestimates. A regressionthatdoes
not include shiftdummies indicates that
hospital RNs in this sample receive 21.0%
higher wages than RNs in nursing homes
and 31.7% higher wages than those employed in health practitioners' offices.
When shiftdummies are included, wage
differencesbetween RNs in the fourindustryclassificationsare lowered.
While the estimated effectsof control-
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Table 7. Evidence on the ShiftPremium for Registered Nurses.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
DescriptiveStatistics
n

Shift(s)
All Shifts
Day Shift
Evening Shift
Night Shift
Rotatingor Split Shift
Other Shift

1,242
703
172
150
129
88

Real Wage(1994 $)

Hospital

NursingHome

17.21
16.60
17.42
18.70
17.70
18.39

0.714
0.619
0.849
0.840
0.876
0.761

0.068
0.067
0.081
0.107
0.031
0.045

Practitioner's
Office
0.051
0.083
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.023

RegressionResults
Variable

(1)

(2)

Hospital

0.201
(0.025)
0.010
(0.041)
-0.074
(0.046)

0.183
(0.025)
0.007
(0.041)
-0.066
(0.045)
0.037
(0.027)
0.110
(0.028)
0.046
(0.030)
0.043
(0.035)
3.983

Nursing Home
Practitioner'sOffice
Evening Shift
Night Shift
Rotatingor Split Shift
Other Shift
F ratio(4,983)

Sources: May 1985 and 1991 dual job supplements to the CPS, merged with the ORG files.
Notes:The F ratio teststhejoint significanceof the shiftvariables. A split shiftis defined as "one consisting
of twodistinctperiods each day,"and a rotatingshiftis "one thatchanges periodicallyfromdays to evenings or
nights." Other variablesincluded are yearsof schooling, experience and itssquare, and dummies forregion (8),
public employment,gender, race (2), marital status (2), and year.

lingforshiftare as expected, theyare rather
modest. The differencein earnings betweenhospital and nursinghome RNs falls
only slightly,consistent with the use of
night shiftsin both hospitals and nursing
homes. The differentialbetween hospital
and health practitioners'officeRNs,where
mosthours are firstshift,fallsbymore than
threepercentage points. Similarly,the differential between hospital RNs and RNs
employed in other industries declines by
about 2 percentage points. These results
are consistentwiththeimplicationofTable
3 (column 4) that RNs in health practitioners' offices earn lower wages primarily
because of relativelypleasant workingcon-

ditions,whilenursinghome RNs have lower
wages due to lower skills.
The magnitudesof the shiftvariablesare
interestingin theirown right(forevidence
from manufacturing,see Kostiuk 1990).
The shiftpremium to evening shiftRNs is
almost 4%, while for night shiftRNs it is
11.6%. There is a small insignificantpremium forworkingrotatingor splitshiftsas
compared to day shift.Although shiftpremiums are significantwage determinants,
theyexplain just under 10% of the crosssectional wage differentialbetween hospitals and health practitioners' offices
(they explain a greater proportion of the
non-abilitycomponent) and little of the
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differentialbetween hospitalsand nursing
homes.
Conclusions
The purpose of this studyhas been to
shed lighton the sources of the large hospital wage premium realized by registered
nurses. Cross-sectional regressions that
controlformeasurable workercharacteristics show an almost 20% wage difference
between hospital and non-hospital RNs.
Evidence on the receipt of health insurance and pension coverage suggests that
the hospital compensationpremium is even
larger.
Panel estimatesfromwage change models indicate thatfroma thirdto a halfof the
hospital premium is due to hospitals attracting nurses of higher (unmeasured)
ability. We conclude that much of the
remainingdifferentialis due to a compensating differentialfor differencesin working conditions. Direct evidence on worker
abilityand job characteristicssupportsour
interpretation. Hospital RNs have higher
cognitiveabilitythan non-hospitalRNs, as
measured by AFQT scores, and also have
higher-qualityexperience, as measured by
the ratiosof totalmarketexperience, company tenure, and occupational tenure to
potential experience. A measurable job
characteristic, shift work, accounts for
roughly10% of the cross-sectionalhospital
premium.21

21Closeto 90% of young RNs (those below age 35)
are found in hospitals, and many RNs move to nonhospital employmentfollowingtheirhospital experience and training. To the extent that RNs pay for
general training in the form of lower wages, the
hospital premium may be understated by our estimates, since hospital RNs receive not only higher
wages and fringebenefits,but also training that increases their subsequent earnings. Separate estimates of the hospital premium for young and old
RNs, however,indicate thatwhile the hospital differential rises slightlywith age when hospital RNs are
compared to RNs in "other"industries(from.109 for
those between the ages of 20 and 35, to .134 forthose
between the ages of 35 and 50, to .142 forthose older
than 50), it does not increase with age when the
comparison group is RNs in practitioners' offices
(.202, .201, and .217 forthe three age groups), and it
decreases slightlywithage when thecomparisongroup
is RNs in nursing homes (.211, .179, and .160).

Despite the importance of hospital employmentamong RNs,and the large magnitude of wage differencesbetween hospital
and non-hospital employment, little research has been directed at uncoveringthe
sources of the premium. Our studytakesa
step in this direction. Based on cross-sectional and panel analysis using large data
sets constructed from various CPS files,
we conclude that hospital RNs receive
compensating differentialsforhigher unmeasured abilities and less pleasant working conditions. The analysis provides
not only what we believe is an interesting
studyof compensating wage differentials,
but also insight into the nature of wage
determination in an importantlabor market.22

Our study also may shed light on the
impact of evolving medical care patterns.
Medical care services have begun to shift
from in-patient hospital facilities to outpatient hospital and non-hospitalsettings.
Indeed, a recentnational commissionstudy
(the Pew Health ProfessionsCommission)
forecast that up to half of the nation's
hospitals will close within five years and
calculated a steep loss in nursingjobs,based
primarilyon expected bed closures. (Brider
[ 1996] provides an appropriatelyskeptical
critique of the commission study.) Whatever shiftsdo occur will not lead to RN
employmentloss proportionalto the loss of
hospitalbeds, butwilldecrease the share of
total RN employmentin hospitals.
At firstglance, the existence of a large
hospital premiummightlead to the expectationthatthe shiftout of hospital employment will result in a significantwage decline forRNs. Despite the sizable hospital
premium, the conclusion that RN wages
and labor costs will decline substantially
need not follow. First,our resultsshowthat
as much as half of the hospital premium
reflectsunmeasured ability,withskill premiums received by high-abilityRNs in or
out of hospitals. Second, half or more of

22Registered nurses comprise the third largest
Census occupation among women, trailingsecretaries and teachers.
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the hospital premium may result from less
pleasant or more demanding working conditions in hospitals. To the extent that such
working conditions are transferred to nonhospital settings, the compensating premium associated with thesejob disamenities
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will follow. Such a shiftwill increase relativeRN wages in non-hospitalsettingsand
lower the measured hospital premium (its
decline since 1992 is suggestive),while having onlya modest effecton overall nursing
labor costs.

APPENDIX
Constructionof Longitudinal Samples fromthe CPS ORG Files and the March CPS
The CPS sample design is such that households
are included in 8 surveys(rotation groups), beginning with 4 consecutive months in, followed by 8
months out, followed by 4 months in. Outgoing
rotation groups 4 and 8 are asked earnings supplement questions (weekly earnings, hours, union status,and so on). The CPS contains household identificationnumbers (ID) and record line numbers,but
not individualidentifiers.Individuals potentiallycan
be identified for the same month in consecutive
years;thatis, individualsin rotation4 in year 1 can be
matched to individuals in rotation 8 in year 2.
The longitudinal ORG file was created in the
followingmanner. Separate data files were created
for men and women, and for pairs of years (rotation
4/1983 and rotation 8/1984, rotation 4/1984 and
rotation 8/1985, and so on). Withineach file, individuals were sorted as appropriate on the basis of
ascending and descending household ID, year, and
age. To be considered an acceptable matched pair, a
rotation8 individual and rotation4 individual had to
have identical household ID, identical surveymonth,
and an age differencebetween 0 and 2 (since surveys
can occur on differentdaysof the month,age change
need not equal 1). Several passes were necessary
because a single household may contain more than
one male or female pair. Checks were provided to
ensure that only unique matches were selected. For
each rotation 8 individual, the search was made
throughall rotation4 individualswiththe same ID to
make sure therewas onlyone possible match; the file
was resorted in reverseorder and each selected rotation 4 individual was checked to ensure a unique
rotation 8 match. As uniquely matched pairs were
identified, they were removed from the work file.
Incorrect changes in the variables maritalstatus,veteran status,race, and education (a change in schooling other than 0 or 1, a change frommarried to never
married,and so on) were used to delete "bad" observations in households where there were multiple
observationsand ages too close to separate matched
pairs. Several passes at the data were made. In
households where two pairs of individuals could be
separated based on a 1-yearbut not the 0-to-2yearage
change, a 1-yearcriterionwas used. If a unique pair
could not be identifiedbased on these criteria,they
were not included in the data set (for example, four

observations with two identical pairs, or three individuals withtwopossible matches usinlgthe 0-to-2age
change criterion).
In some cases we were unable to create a match or
to include individual worker pairs in the CPS ORG
panel. The conditions that most often prevented us
fromdoing so were thefollowing:a household moved
(thus changing the household ID); an individual
moved out of a household; a worker became selfemployed; an individual dropped out of the labor
marketor failed to meet other sample selection criteria; or the Census was unable to reinterviewa household or receive informationon the individual. Inclusion rates for the entire CPS ORG panel are just
under two-thirdsof employed wage and salaryworkers in any year; rates are somewhat lower in our RN
sample. Peracchi and Welch (1995) analyzed attrition rates among matched March CPS files and concluded thatage is the mostimportantdeterminantof
a successful match. Other factorsthat lessen match
probabilitiesare poor health, low schooling, and not
a household head, while sex and race are unimportant match predictors following control for other
factors. Finally,sample sizes are reduced furtherto
roughlyhalf the normal size for the 1984/85 panel
and to one-quarterfor 1985/86. This is the resultof
a CPS test sample fromJuly-September1985 that
implemented new population weights. Rotation 4
households interviewedinJuly1984 throughSeptember 1985 were not reintervieweda year later in 1985
and 1986.
The March CPS longitudinal file is a retrospective
panel. All rotationgroups in March are asked information about earnings, weeks worked, and hours
workedlast year,and occupation and industryon the
longestjob held last year. A quarter sample in March
(the ORGs) are asked currentearnings,hours,and so
on. All those in the March sample are matched to
theirearnings supplement records in theiroutgoing
month, either March, April, May, or June. These
records were matched initiallyon the basis of household ID and line number, followed by checks on
changes in sex and age to ensure an accurate match.
The March retrospectivepanel is about three-quartersthe size of a March sample based on the presence
of earnings last year (and other typical variables).
Losses are due to households moving, individuals
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leaving the household, changing employment status (that is, leaving the labor force or shifting to
self-employment),changing line number, a failure
to be reinterviewed, and missing hours or weekly
earnings in the earnings supplement among em-

ployed wage and salary workers who are otherwise
matched. The March CPS file and CPS ORG panel
files are merged, with the March-June records
deleted from the CPS ORG files to prevent double
counting.
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